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Abstract
We consider a wireless ad hoc network in the presence of eavesdroppers (EDs), where the nodes are distributed
according to independent Poisson point processes (PPPs). The legitimate nodes follow the half-duplex mode of
operation employing the slotted ALOHA protocol for transmission. For such a network, a novel communication
scheme that induces a time-varying secure connectivity graph (SCG) is proposed, and the connectivity behavior of
this induced SCG is studied. In particular, for a legitimate node in the network, we analyze (i) the average number
of incoming edges and the average number of outgoing edges; (ii) the time to nearest-neighbor secure connectivity;
and (iii) a condition on the EDs’ density that allows information percolation, i.e., a condition for the existence of a
‘giant’ component. The average time for secure connectivity among the nodes in this giant component is shown to
scale linearly with the Euclidean distance. Further, we show that by splitting the packets into two sub-packets and
routing each sub-packet along paths that are sufficiently far apart can (a) potentially improve secure connectivity
and (b) reduce the overall delay incurred in exchanging packets between any two legitimate nodes in the giant
component.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless ad hoc networks continue to receive significant attention due to its remarkable features of
information exchange between the constituent nodes in the network. As the size of the ad hoc networks
grows, the physical-layer issues especially interference prohibit the existence of a direct link between the
nodes in the network. A suitable alternative is multi-hop networks, where the intermediate nodes could
act as relays to improve the overall throughput. However, it has been observed that, owing to channel
impairments, the time required to establish a communication link between any two nodes (path-formation
time) could be longer than the number of hops in the network resulting in undesirable delays [1]. The
delay analysis of wireless ad hoc networks has been of great interest in the community; see, for example,
[1]–[11].
An added dimension to the delay problem arises due to eavesdroppers (EDs) with the malicious intent
of trying to disrupt the communication between two nodes. When there is sufficient knowledge of the
presence of EDs, the path-formation mechanism to establish connection between the source and destination
nodes should also take into account the security aspect. The delay performance of wireless networks
in the presence of EDs has been well reported [12]–[28]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the characterization of average delay in secure communication using the dynamic graph model is less
understood. In this paper, we make progress on this problem by studying the impact of EDs on the
average delay incurred for single/multi-hop communication between a pair of nodes by considering the
dynamic graph model of wireless ad hoc networks. Specifically, we consider the dynamically varying
secrecy graph under a protocol similar to the one proposed in [1].
It is standard practice to model a dynamic wireless network as a time-varying graph; see, for example,
[29]. Given a time varying wireless network, the presence and absence of links in the corresponding
dynamic graph can be defined using the channel condition between any two nodes. The long-range
connectivity between any two nodes in such a dynamic graph can thus be analyzed using tools from
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2percolation theory [30], which is typically used to study the behavior of a connected cluster of nodes in a
random graph. The existence of the so-called ‘giant component’ is critical to get a proper handle on the
connectivity of nodes in the random graph. Essentially, the giant component in a dynamic graph facilitates
the study of communication between nodes located far apart, especially to characterize the time delay
between the nodes involved in communication. In this paper, we concern ourselves with the analysis of
time delay between nodes located in the giant component in the presence of EDs.
In our model, both legitimate nodes and EDs are assumed to be distributed according to independent
Poisson Point Processes (PPPs) with different densities. The legitimate nodes follow the half-duplex mode
of operation employing the slotted ALOHA protocol for transmission. We will study the impact of the
transmission probability of a node on the average time required for secure-connectivity. Specifically, we
will characterize the average delay of the following two packet forwarding schemes:
(1) Direct-path-based approach: Two nodes can securely communicate with each other within a radius
of η > 0 satisfying the interference constraint with no EDs in the vicinity of the transmitter. Using
slotted ALOHA this model induces a secure-connectivity graph (SCG) with time-varying links. A
packet is forwarded from the source to the destination via the minimum delay path in the SCG. For
a legitimate node in the network, we analyze the average number of incoming edges (in-degree) and
the average number of outgoing edges (out-degree) in the static SCG, and the average time for the
nearest neighbor connectivity of a node in the dynamic SCG in the presence of EDs. Different from
[1], we present a condition on the legitimate node density for the existence of a ‘giant component’
(defined in Section IV) of securely-connected links. An upper bound on the average delay incurred
between any two nodes in the giant component is derived. We show that even in the presence of EDs,
the average delay scales linearly with the Euclidean distance.
(2) Two secure path-based approach: Here, there exists two types of paths between two legitimate nodes
in the SCG, namely, a direct path or a split path. A packet is divided into two independent sub-
packets and sent to the destination along two different paths. Assume that the secure communication
is achieved if EDs cannot decode both the packets. If the two paths are “sufficiently far apart”, packets
securely reach the destination. Unlike the direct-path approach, it suffices to maintain security only in
the vicinity of the communicating pair. Using percolation theory, we show that the secure-connectivity
of the graph can be increased, while at the same time the overall delay can be reduced for any pair
of nodes in the giant component. Similar to the direct-path approach, the delay scales linearly with
the Euclidean distance. This approach is similar in spirit to network coding.
A preliminary version of this paper can be found in [31]. Notation: E{·} denotes the expectation
operator, 1{·} is the indicator function. The Euclidian norm is denoted by ‖ · ‖2. For any x, y ∈ R2,
B(x, y) denotes a two-dimensional Euclidian ball of radius ‖y‖2 centered at x. We use X (d)= Y to denote
that the distributions of random variables X and Y are same.
Section II comprises the system model and our protocol for secure communication. Properties of the
connectivity graph resulting from the protocol model are established in Section III. The existence of a
giant component and the delay analysis for secure communication for the two schemes is presented in
Section IV. Concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The legitimate nodes (denoted by Φl ⊆ R2) and the EDs (denoted by Φe ⊆ R2) are distributed as
independent PPPs with densities λl ≥ 0 and λe ≥ 0, respectively, in the two-dimensional Euclidean space
R2. Time is slotted and Φl’s employ the slotted ALOHA protocol for transmission, i.e., they transmit
with probability p. Due to the half-duplex mode of operation, the set of transmitting and receiving nodes
vary across time. In slot k ∈ N, the set of transmitting and receiving nodes are denoted by Φt(k) ⊆ Φl
and Φr(k) ⊆ Φl \ Φt(k), respectively. The following protocol decides whether two legitimate nodes can
communicate with each other securely: In slot k, a node x ∈ Φt(k) can securely connect to a node
y ∈ Φr(k) if it satisfies the following constraints:
3(C1) for η > 0, ‖x − y‖2 < η, which ensures that the transmitters and receivers are close enough to
communicate
(C2) for βl > 0, the disk B(y, βl‖x− y‖2) does not contain any transmitting nodes, which ensures that a
receiver does not experience interference above a tolerable level.
(C3) for βe > 0, the disk B(x, βe‖x− y‖2) does not contain EDs. βe > 1 signifies that an ED can decode
the message even if it is at a farther away from the corresponding legitimate receiver.
This connectivity model together with the slotted ALOHA induces a time-varying SCG on the network.
The SCG from slot m to slot n denoted by G(m,n) is characterized by (Φl,
⋃n
k=mEk), where Ek :=
{(x, y) ⊆ (Φt(k),Φr(k)) : 1(x (1)→ y) × 1(no EDs in B(x, βe‖x − y‖)) = 1}. Here 1{x (1)→ y} denotes
a single hop connectivity between the two legitimate nodes x and y in the SCG for a given k without
the security constraints. The function 1(no EDs in B(x, βe‖x − y‖)) = 1 if there are no EDs in a circle
of radius βe‖x − y‖ centered at x, and 0 otherwise. A causal secure path exists between x and y if
there exists N > 0 time slots k1 < k2 < . . . < kN and N nodes z1, z2, . . . , zN ⊆ Φl s.t. (x, z1) ∈ Ek1 ,
(z1, z2) ∈ Ek2 , . . . , (xN , y) ∈ EkN . Two nodes are securely connected iff there is a causal path between
them [1]. For SCG at a given k, we drop the index and let Φt and Φr denote the set of transmitting and
receiving nodes, respectively.
III. PROPERTIES OF SECURE-CONNECTIVITY GRAPH
Let us consider a legitimate node at the origin o ≡ (0, 0) (this is typical for PPPs [32]). For a dynamic
SCG, the minimum time T Sc required for this node to securely communicate with another legitimate node
in the network using a single hop is expressed as follows:
T Sc = argmin
k

1(o ∈ Φt(k)) ∏
x∈Φr(k)
(1− 1(o (1)→ x,S))

 , (1)
where 1(o
(1)→ x,S) denotes one hop secure connection between the node at o ≡ (0, 0) and the one at
x ∈ R2.
Lemma 1: The average time for one-hop connectivity is infinity, i.e., E!oT SC =∞.
Proof : Without the security constraint, it is known that the average time for one-hop connectivity E!o[T SC ] =
∞, where the expectation is with respect to the palm measure [1]. Thus, with security constraint, we have
E!oT SC =∞. 
Lemma 1 guides us in considering the average time for multi-hop connectivity. Since a multi-hop
involves intermediate nodes at different time slots, it is of great interest to study the node degree distribution
of the SCG at a given k. We next characterize the average in-degree and the out-degree of any node (for
SCG at a given k), and the time to nearest-neighbor secure-connectivity (for dynamic SCG). Later, we
will invoke these to characterize the average delay incurred in securely transmitting a packet between two
legitimate nodes.
A. Average Node Degree of the SCG for a given k
Consider a transmitter at the origin, and let Nt,0 denote its secure out-degree, i.e., the number of nodes
that it can securely connect to is given by
Nt,0 :=
∑
x∈Φr
1{0 (1)→ x}1{no EDs in B(0, βe‖x‖)}. (2)
The average out-degree is characterized by the following theorem.
4Theorem 1: For the network of legitimate nodes and EDs distributed as a PPP with densities λl and
λe, respectively, and with legitimate nodes employing the slotted ALOHA protocol, the average secure
out degree is given by
ENt,0 =
λl(1− p)[1− exp(−(λlpβ2l + λeβ2e )πη2)]
(λlpβ
2
l + λeβ
2
e )
. (3)
Proof : See Appendix A. 
When λe = 0, we obtain the expression for the average out-degree without EDs derived in [1]. The
average out-degree is a decreasing function of λe. The interference-limited regime and the noise-limited
regime, which are obtained letting η →∞ and βl → 0, respectively, yield [1]
lim
η→∞
ENt,0 =
λl(1− p)
λlpβ2l + λeβ
2
e ,
and (4)
lim
βl→0
ENt,0 =
λl(1− p)(1− exp(−λeβ2eπη2))
λeβ2e
. (5)
In the interference-limited regime, as λl → ∞, the number of adjacent nodes and the fraction of the
interfering nodes go to ∞. This counter-effect results in a constant average out-degree. From (4), as
λl →∞, the average out-degree→ 1−ppβ2
l
. However, in the noise-limited regime, as λl →∞, the number of
adjacent nodes →∞, and hence the average out degree also →∞ [see (5)]. In both cases, as λe →∞,
the average out-degree → 0. Next, we present the average secure in-degree of a receiving node at the
origin. Let Nr,0 denote the in-degree, i.e., the number of nodes from which the node at the origin can
receive data securely:
Nr,0 :=
∑
y∈Φt
1{y (1)→ 0}1{no EDs in B(y, βe‖y‖)}. (6)
The average in-degree of a typical node at the origin is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For the network of legitimate nodes (employing slotted ALOHA) and EDs distributed
as a PPPs with densities λl and λe, respectively, the average secure in-degree is given by ENr,0 =
λlp[1−exp(−(λlpβ2l +λeβ2e )πη2)]
(λlpβ
2
l
+λeβ2e )
.
Proof : See Appendix B. 
The expressions for the average out-degree and the average in-degree differs only by a factor of
ENr,0
ENt,0
=
p
1−p . When p = 1/2, the average in-degree is equal to the average out-degree. Thus, the observations made
for the average out-degree holds good for the average in-degree as well. In the next subsection, we derive
the average time required for a node in the dynamic SCG to securely connect to its nearest neighbor.
B. Average Time for Secure Nearest Neighbor Connectivity
Due to the slotted ALOHA, a node may require multiple attempts before it can securely connect to its
neighbor. Since PPPs are assumed to be stationary, let T SNNC denote the time required for a node at (0, 0)
to securely connect to its nearest neighbor in the dynamic SCG. An expression for E{T sNNC} is given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The mean time for secure nearest neighbor connectivity in the SCG is given by
E{T SNNC} =
{
λl
λl−λeβ2e− p1−pλlγ(βl)
, p < λl−λeβ
2
e
λlγ(βl)−λl+λeβ2e
∞ otherwise,
where
γ(x) = x2 − 1
π
{
x2 cos−1
x
2
+ cos−1
(
1− x
2
2
)
− x
2
√
4− x2
}
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Fig. 1: Average delay vs. λl/λe, for βe = 0.6 and βl = 0.2.
if x < 2, and x2 − 1 if x ≥ 2.
Proof : See Appendix C. 
The average time for secure nearest neighbor connectivity exhibits a phase transition behavior (see
Fig. 1). As the relative density λl
λe
increases, the average delay decreases, and approaches a value sur-
rounding 1, which is the minimum delay possible. For higher p, the transition happens at higher values of
the relative density, because of fewer active receivers. Next, we study the percolation and dissemination of
information in the SCG for a given k, which will pave the way for characterizing the secure communication
delay for legitimate nodes in the giant component of the dynamic SCG.
IV. PERCOLATION OF INFORMATION
We begin with the definition of a giant component, i.e., a connected component with infinitely many
nodes.
Definition 1: We say that a giant component exists if
G = {Cs ⊆ Φl : |Cs| =∞, ∀(x, y) ∈ Cs, 1{x→ y,S} = 1} occurs with probability one, where 1{x→
y,S} indicates the existence of a casual multi-hop secure communication between the two legitimate
nodes x and y.
Even if two nodes are separated by at most η and the interference constraint is satisfied, they may still
not be able to securely communicate. This situation may arise, for example, when there are ED nodes
located in the vicinity of the transmitting node, leading to the violation of condition (C3) in Sec. II. Thus,
for any three consecutive nodes x, y and z in the minimum delay path, ‖x− z‖2 need not be greater than
η. This situation is in contrast to a wireless ad hoc network without EDs, where for the three nodes x, y
and z in the minimum delay path, ‖x− z‖2 > η; otherwise it leads to a contradiction. Thus to facilitate
the proof of the existence of a giant component, and the ensuing delay analysis, we have the following
definition of ζ-path, ζ > 0.
Definition 2: A secure path is a ζ-path, if for any three consecutive legitimate nodes x, y and z in
the path, i.e., ‖x− y‖2 < η and ‖y − z‖ < η, we have ‖x− z‖2 > ζ .
6We will now analyze the direct-path and split-path approaches for secure communication in the SCG.
We derive conditions on the EDs’ densities to have giant components in each of the SCGs. We prove that
the paths in the giant component are η√
3
-paths, which enables us to show that the delay scales linearly
with the Euclidean distance between any pair of nodes in the giant component.
A. Percolation for direct-path approach
We first derive a condition on λl for a giant component to exist in the SCG. In Theorem 4, we show that
the giant component exists with non-zero probability if λl scales linearly with λe. Once this is established,
for any realization of the network, there could be potentially many paths between the nodes in the giant
component. Our packet forwarding scheme picks the path with the minimum information propagation
delay. The minimum delay path need not correspond to a path with the minimum number of hops. For
this protocol, we derive an expression for the average delay for the two nodes in the giant component to
securely communicate (see (9)).
Theorem 4: For the secure communication protocol model, ∃ d1 ∈ (0,∞) and ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1) s.t.
Pr
{
∃ a giant component consisting of η√
3
-paths
}
> 0 if for any 0 ≤ δ < log
(
1
1−ǫ1
)
, the following
condition holds
λl >
(
ns + 2
√
3βe
)
(1 + 2
√
3βe) log
[
1
1−exp{−δ/ns}
]
Cδ,ǫ1
λe,
where ns =
⌈
d1
√
3
η
⌉
, Cδ,ǫ1 :=
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ1
)
− δ
]
.
Proof : See Appendix D. 
Using Theorem 4 and the fact that there exists an η/
√
3-path implies the existence of a secure path.
Corollary 1: For the secure communication protocol model, ∃ d1 ∈ [0,∞] and ǫ1 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. Pr{∃ a
giant component} > 0 if the lower bound of Theorem 4 is satisfied.
For p < 1, almost surely there exists a time slot k < ∞, where the interference condition is satisfied.
Thus, any two legitimate nodes can communicate securely if conditions (C1) and (C3) of the communi-
cation protocol presented in Sec. II are satisfied, and if they can wait for a sufficiently long time. Due
to this, the above lower bound on λl does not depend on p and βl. Further, if λe = 0, the above bound
reduces to λl > 0. That is, if λl > 0, a non-zero fraction of realizations of the network will have a
giant component. This is in contrast to the almost sure existence of the giant component, which requires
λl >
1.435
η2
[33]. As η →∞, the lower bound on λl goes to zero, which is in line with λe = 0 case.
We upper bound the average delay between two nodes in the giant component to analyze the variation
of average time versus (i) distance, (ii) density of legitimate nodes, and (iii) density of ED nodes. The
minimum delay between two nodes x and y is the delay between x∗ = argminz∈G ‖x − z‖2 and y∗ =
argminz∈G ‖y − z‖2.
Let T (nsp)(m,n) = argmink≥0{k : G(0, k) has a secure causal path between (m, 0) and (n, 0)} denote
the minimum delay of a causal path between (m, 0) and (n, 0). Lnsp(m,n) denotes the number of hops.
Consider two points (0, 0) and (0, n). The delay definition is reasonable if ‖x∗0−x∗n‖2 scales linearly with n.
Towards this, we have n = ‖(0, 0)−(n, 0)‖2 = ‖(0, 0)−x∗0+x∗0−x∗n+x∗n−(n, 0)‖2
(a)
≤ θ1+‖x∗0−x∗n‖2+θ2,
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality, and it follows from [34, Lemma 8] that θ1 := ‖(0, 0)−x∗0‖2
and θ2 := ‖x∗n − (n, 0)‖2 are almost surely bounded random variables. Thus, ‖x∗0 − x∗n‖2 ≥ n− θ1 − θ2.
Since θ1 and θ2 are bounded almost surely, it follows from limn→∞ θin = 0 almost surely for i = 1, 2 that
limn→∞
‖x∗0−x∗n‖2
n
≥ 1 almost surely.
Next, we have the following upper bound: ‖x∗0 − x∗n‖2 ≤ ‖x∗0 − (0, 0)‖2 + ‖(0, 0) − (n, 0)‖2 +
‖(n, 0) − x∗n‖2 ≤ θ1 + θ2 + n. Similarly, we have limn→∞ ‖x
∗
0−x∗n‖2
n
≤ 1 almost surely. This implies
that limn→∞
‖x∗0−x∗n‖2
n
= 1 almost surely. Thus, it is sufficient to analyze the delay between two nodes
along a straight line path [35]. In this analysis, we utilize the sub-additivity property of the PPP [35]
T (nsp)(0, n) ≤ T (nsp)(0, k) + T (nsp)
T (nsp)(0,k)
(k, n), (7)
7where, T (nsp)
T (nsp)(0,k)
(k, n) denotes the minimum delay of a causal secure path that exists between nodes at
(k, 0) and (n, 0), where the causal path starts at a time slot equal to T (nsp)(0, k). Taking the expectation
of (7) conditioned on the existence of the giant component, and using the fact that T (nsp)
T (nsp)(0,k)
(k, n)
(d)
=
T (nsp)(0, n−k), we get E|GT (nsp)(0, n) ≤ E|GT (nsp)(0, k)+E|GT (nsp)(0, n−k). Recursively applying this, we
get E|GT (nsp)(0, n) ≤ nE|GT (nsp)(0, 1). Thus, to upper bound the average delay, it suffices to upper bound
E|GT (nsp)(0, 1). To do this, we simply upper bound the average number of hops between nodes at (0, 0)
and (1, 0):
Theorem 5: For our protocol model, and given the conditions of Theorem 4, E|GLnsp(0, 1) can be
upper-bounded as
E|GLnsp(0, 1) ≤
12d2δnsp
πη2
(
9δ4nsp
9δ4nsp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4nsp
δ4nsp
(8)
for some δnsp >
4
√
8
9
and dδnsp <∞. Also, E|GLnsp(0, 1) <∞.
Proof : See Appendix F. 
Theorem 5 provides an upper bound on the average number of hops between a pair of nodes in the giant
component that are close to the origin and (0, 1). An upper bound on the corresponding average delay
is at most equal to the sum of the delays of each of the links in the path. A more precise statement is
proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: For our protocol model, given the conditions of Theorem 4, for some δnsp >
4
√
8
9
and
d2δnsp ≥ d, we have
E|GTnsp(0, 1) ≤ exp
(
η2
3
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)
))[
12d2δnsp
πη2
(
9δ4nsp
9δ4nsp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4nsp
δ4nsp
]
.
Proof: See Appendix G. 
Lemma 2 and E|GTnsp(0, n) ≤ nETnsp(0, 1) yields
E|GTnsp(0, n)
n
≤ exp
(
η2
3
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)
))[
12d2δnsp
πη2
(
9δ4nsp
9δ4nsp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4nsp
δ4nsp
]
,
where the right hand side is finite for p < 1. Therefore, for λe <∞, an upper bound on the average delay
between any pair of nodes in the giant component scales linearly with the Euclidean distance.
Lemma 3: A lower bound on the average delay between two nodes that are separated by a distance
d scales linearly with d, i.e., E|GT opt(0, d) ≥
(
d
η
− 1
)
exp
(
η2
(
λl
p
1−pπγ(βl)
))
, where T opt(0, d) is the
delay for the optimum scheme.
Thus, limd→∞
ET nsp(0,d)
d
= constant < ∞, concluding that the scaling of the average delay with the
Euclidian distance between source and destination nodes in the giant component remains unchanged due
to the presence of EDs.
In Fig. 2, we show the average delay for the direct path approach versus distance for different values
of p and η. The legitimate nodes and EDs are located in a 20m2 area distributed according to PPPs with
λl = 1 and λe = 0.1, respectively. We have also plotted the straight line approximation along with the
actual delay. The delay is averaged over 2000 realizations of the network. As seen, the delay scales linearly
with the Euclidean distance. Further, the right hand side of (9) is a monotonically increasing function of p.
This is because as p increases, more legitimate nodes become transmitters leading to a larger time for per
hop communication. Similar conclusion is drawn when λe = 0 [35]. As η increases, the communication
range of each legitimate node increases. This leads to longer hops, and hence requires stringent condition
on the interference [see (C2) of Sec. II], leading to a larger per hop delay. On the other hand, increasing η
decreases the number of hops between any pair of legitimate nodes in the giant component. This tradeoff
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Fig. 2: Average delay vs. Euclidean distance for different p and η. Solid lines refer to the simulation,
dashed line refers to a linear fit. βe = 0.8, βl = 1.2.
is captured in (9). The direct-path protocol has the limitation that a shorter path may not always exist
due to the presence of EDs leading to a larger delay. Next, we develop the split-path approach based on
the idea of packet splitting [17] to improve the connectivity and the delay performance compared to the
direct-path scheme.
B. Percolation for split-path approach
One of the drawbacks of the direct-path scheme is that the entire path in the SCG needs to be secure. This
leads to a stringent requirement on the number of legitimate nodes that enable percolation of information.
To alleviate this shortcoming, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: Every packet in the network can be broken into two independent packets. Secure com-
munication takes place if none of the EDs is able to decode both the packets.
For any pair of legitimate nodes in the network, packets are routed along a direct-path, or a spit-path,
or a combination of direct and split paths. The main idea behind split-path (packet-splitting) algorithm is
to break the packet into two sub-packets. By Assumption 1, no ED should be able to decode both the
packets. This amounts to routing the two packets in two different paths that are “sufficiently” far apart
to the destination node maintaining the security constraint only at a region “near” the source node and
the destination node. Thus, the entire region in the path need not be secure. It suffices for the source-
destination pair to know the locations of EDs in its neighborhood. We use the term “two-secure path” for
the path which consists of a combination of both direct and split-paths. We first establish a condition for
the existence of a giant component corresponding to the packet splitting scheme.
Theorem 6: For our protocol model with splitting and routing of packets, there exists d2 ∈ (0,∞) and
ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that Pr{∃ a giant component} > 0, if for any 0 ≤ δ < log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
, λl ≥ min{ρsp, ρnsp}λe,
where ρsp :=
4(1+2
√
3βe)(4+
√
3βe)
Cδ,ǫ2
log
(
1
1−exp{− δ2(ns+4)}
)
and ρnsp :=
(ns+2
√
3βe)(1+2
√
3βe)
Cδ,ǫ2
log
(
1
1−exp{− δns}
)
.
Here, ns :=
⌈
d2
√
3
η
⌉
and Cδ,ǫ2 :=
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
− δ
]
.
9Proof : See Appendix H for the proof. 
As before, let the minimum delay between any two points x and y in R2 be the delay between the nodes
x∗ and y∗ in the giant component that are close to x and y, respectively. We let T (sp)(m,n) to denote
the minimum delay of a causal path between (m, 0) and (n, 0), and the corresponding number of hops
by Lsp(m,n). With a slight abuse of notation, let G denote the giant component. Also, E|GT (sp)(0, n) ≤
nE|GT (sp)(0, 1). Thus, to obtain an upper bound on the average delay T (sp)(0, n), it suffices to upper bound
E|GT (sp)(0, 1). In fact, it suffices to upper bound E|GLsp(0, 1), as shown below.
Theorem 7: For our protocol model with the splitting and routing of packets, and given the conditions
of Theorem 6, we have E|GLsp(0, 1) ≤
12d2δsp
πη2
(
9δ4sp
9δ4sp−8
)
+
1+δ4sp
δ4sp
, for some δsp >
4
√
8
9
and dδsp <∞. Further,
E|GLsp(0, 1) <∞.
Proof : See Appendix I. 
Lastly, we derive an upper bound on the average delay between any two nodes in the giant component.
Corollary 2: For the protocol model in Sec. II, and given the conditions of Theorem 6, an upper bound
on the average delay denoted E|GTsp(0, 1) between any two nodes in the giant component is given by
E|GTsp(0, 1) ≤ exp
[
η2
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)
)][
12d2δsp
πη2
(
9δ4sp
9δ4sp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4sp
δ4sp
]
for some δsp >
4
√
8
9
and dδsp <∞. Further, E|GTsp(0, 1) <∞.
Proof: Similar to that of Theorem 2, and is omitted. 
A combination of direct and split paths is more resilient to EDs since λe has lesser impact on the delays
corresponding to split-paths. The above bound indirectly captures this effect through δsp, which is the
crossing probability of a rectangle of size dδsp . Intuitively, the rate at which δsp decreases with λe is faster
compared to the rate at which δnsp decreases with λe. Now, E|GTsp(0, n) ≤ nE|GTsp(0, 1) implies that
E|GTsp(0, n)
n
≤ exp
[
η2
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)
)][
12d2δsp
πη2
(
9δ4sp
9δ4sp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4sp
δ4sp
]
,
where the right hand side is independent of n, and hence finite. This along with the lower bound in Lemma
3 shows that the average delay scales linearly with the Euclidian distance between any two legitimate
nodes in the giant component.
This result utilizes the fact that the per hop delay is at most equal to exp
(
η2
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1−pπγ(βl)
))
.
The bound does not capture the per-hop delays involved in the split-paths. Accounting for the average delay
corresponding to split-paths amounts to finding the average number of hops in the split-path along any
two-secure paths, which is mathematically intractable. However, this bound captures the scaling behavior
of the delay with respect to the Euclidian distance. The differences lie in the condition for the giant
component to exist and the constants in the delay expressions.
To contrast the two schemes, we compare the results of Theorems 4 and 6 with those of Theorems 7
and 5, respectively. Firstly, Snsp ⊆ Ssp, where Snsp and Ssp denote the existence of a giant component for
direct-path scheme and two-secure path scheme, respectively.
Lemma 4: Given the schemes, Pr{Snsp} ≤ Pr{Ssp} and E|GTsp(0, n) ≤ E|GTnsp(0, n).
Since Snsp ⊆ Ssp, the minimum λl required for the giant component to exist is smaller with packet splitting
than with direct-path. Therefore, from the connectivity viewpoint, packet splitting is better than direct-path,
i.e., given λl and λe, the number of secure connections is larger on an average for packet splitting. To
compare the average delay for secure communication, we let the crossing probabilities of the two schemes
to be equal, i.e., δsp = δnsp. Thus, to show the significance of the packet splitting approach, it suffices
to prove that dδsp ≤ dδnsp . The proof follows from the fact that Vnsp ⊆ Vsp, where Vsp and Vnsp denote
the number of securely connected links in the network with and without packet splitting, repspectively.
We conclude that the splitting-based approach is better compared to direct-path. Both the schemes are
10
order-optimal with respect to the Euclidian distance, i.e., the delays in both cases scale linearly with
Euclidean distance. The performance gain obtained by using packet splitting approach is only in terms of
a constant factor.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considered the delay analysis of a wireless ad hoc network in the presence of EDs. We
assumed that both legitimate nodes and ED nodes are distributed according to independent PPPs. The
legitimate nodes employ slotted ALOHA for packet transmission. The secure communication protocol is
shown to induce a dynamic SCG. We analyzed certain characteristics of this static/dynamic SCG such as
the average in-degree and out-degree, and the average time for the nearest neighbor secure-connectivity.
For the SCG, we derived a condition for the existence of a giant component. An upper bound on the
average delay for the two nodes in the giant component to securely exchange information was derived. The
upper bound reveals that the average delay scales linearly with the Euclidean distance between any pair of
nodes in the giant component. Further, we showed that by breaking the packets into two sub-packets, and
routing the sub-packets packets in different paths that are sufficiently far apart can potentially improve the
secure-connectivity and reduce the overall delay incurred in exchanging packets between any two nodes
in the giant component. For this approach, the delay again scales linearly with the Euclidian distance.
Thus, we both the proposed approaches are order optimal with respect to the Euclidian distance, while
the packet-splitting approach can improve the delay by only a constant scaling factor. The study of the
impact of node mobility and directional antennas for secure communication are interesting avenues for
future research.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
From (2), we have ENt,0 = EΦlEΦe
∑
x∈Φr 1{0
(1)→ x}×1{no EDs in B(0, βe‖x‖)}. Using the fact that
E1{no EDs in B(0, βe‖x‖)} = Pr {no EDs in B(0, βe‖x‖)} , which is equal to first contact distribution
of the PPP, the expression simplifies to EΦl
∑
x∈Φr 1{0
(1)→ x} exp(−λeπβ2e‖x‖2). Using Campbell’s
theorem [32], we get
λl(1− p)
∫
B(0,η)
exp(−λlβ2l π‖x‖2) exp(−λeπβ2e‖x‖2)dx =
λl(1− p)Eg
(λlpβ2l + λeβ
2
e )
, (9)
where Eg := [1− exp(−(λlpβ2l + λeβ2e )πη2)]. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Taking the expectation of (6), ENr,0 can be written as
ENr,0 = EΦl,Φe
∑
y∈Φt
1{y (1)→ 0} × 1{no EDs in B(y, βe‖y‖)}
(a)
= EΦl
∑
y∈Φt
1{y (1)→ 0} exp(−λeπβ2e‖y‖2)
(b)
= λlp
∫
R2
EΦt [1{y
(1)→ 0}] exp(−λeπβ2e‖y‖2)dy,
= λlp
∫
B(0,η)
exp(−λlpπβ2l ‖y‖2 − πλeβ2e‖y‖2)dy, (10)
where (a) follows from the first contact distribution of the PPP, and (b) follows from the Campbell’s
theorem [32]. Solving for equation (10) proves Theorem 2. 
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C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let Ng,0 = z be the nearest neighbor to the origin. Let us denote the indicator function corresponding
to a one-hop secure connection between the node at the origin and the nearest neighbor at z after k time
slots by
1k{0 (1)→ z,S} =
∏
x∈F
(1− 1{x ∈ B(z, βl‖z‖)}1{x ∈ Φt(k)})× 1{no EDs in B(0, βl‖z‖)}, (11)
where F := Φl ∩ B(0, ‖z‖)c. Since T SNNC is a positive random variable, we can write
E{T SNNC} =
∞∑
k=0
P{T SNNC > k} = Ez,Φl
∞∑
k=0
P{T SNNC > k|z,Φl}. (12)
But, P{T SNNC > k|z,Φl} = EΦe
∏k
l=0(1− 1l{0
(1)→ z,S}), which can be used in (12) to get
E{T SNNC} = EZ,Φl
∞∑
k=0
EΦe
k∏
l=0
(1− 1l{0 (1)→ z,S})
(a)
= EZ,Φl
∞∑
k=0
sk = EZexp(λeπβ
2
e‖z‖2)E
∏
x∈Φl∩B(0,‖z‖)c
f(x, z)
(b)
= EZ exp
(
λeπβ
2
e‖z‖2
)
exp (−λlg(z))
= EZ exp
(
λeπβ
2
e‖z‖2 + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)‖z‖
2
)
= 2πλl
∫ ∞
0
y exp
[
−
(
λl − λeβ2e −
p
1− pλlγ(βl)
)
y2
]
dy, (13)
where (a) follows from the fact that the ALOHA protocol is independent across time,
sk =

1− ∏
x∈Φl∩B(0,‖z‖)c
(1− 1{x ∈ B(z, βl‖z‖)}p) exp(−λeπβ2e‖z‖2)


k
, (14)
f(x, z) =
1
(1− 1{x ∈ B(z, βl‖z‖)}p) , (15)
g(z) =
∫
B(0,‖z‖)c
[
1− 1
1− 1{x ∈ B(z, βl‖z‖)}p
]
dx, (16)
and (b) follows from the probability generating functional [32], and γ(βl) is defined in Theorem 3. Finally,
(13) can be simplified to get (7) which completes the proof of Theorem 3. 
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Recall that {1ω(x→ y,S)} denotes the existence of a secure ω-path between the two legitimate nodes
x and y. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is no percolation [29], i.e.,
Pr{∃ C ⊆ Φl : |C| =∞ and ∀(x, y) ⊆ C, 1s(x→ y,S) = 1} = 0, (17)
where s > 0 (to be determined later). Later we will choose s = η√
3
as required. Here, a path always refers
to a secure s-path, unless otherwise stated explicitly. Denote a ball centered at the origin o ≡ (0, 0) and
radius n ∈ N by B(0, n). We say that the ball B(0, n) is open if ∀ x ∈ B(0, n) ∩ Φl, there exists at least
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one node y ∈ B(0, n)c ∩ Φl such that 1s{x → y,S} = 1; otherwise, the ball is closed. From (17), there
exists an i ∈ N such that B(0, i) is closed. Therefore, we have
1 = Pr{∪∞i=1B(0, i) is closed}
= Pr{ lim
n→∞
n⋃
i=1
B(0, i) is closed}
= lim
n→∞
Pr{
n⋃
i=1
B(0, i) is closed}, (18)
where the last equality follows from the continuity property of the probability measure. Using the limit
property, this implies that there exists an ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and Nǫ¯ <∞ such that Pr{
⋃Nǫ¯
i=1 B(0, i) is closed} > ǫ¯.
From the union bound, we have
∑Nǫ¯
i=1 Pr{B(0, i) is closed} > ǫ¯. This implies that there exists an
ǫ
′ ∈ (0, 1) and n1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nǫ¯} such that Pr {B(0, n1) is closed} > ǫ′ . Thus, from stationarity of the
PPPs, for every N ∋ r1 > n1 we have,
aǫ
′
< Pr{B(0, n1) is closed} = Pr
{
La,o6→n1
⋂
V(r1)
}
+ Pr
{
La,o6→n1
⋂
Vc(r1)
}
,
≤ Pr
{
La,o6→n1
⋂
V(r1)
}
+ Pr {Vc(r1)} (19)
a where La,o6→n1 :=
⋂
x∈B(0,n1)c
⋂
Φl
{1s {o→ x, S} = 0} and V(r1) := {∃ at least one legitimate node
in B(0, n1)c
⋂
B(0, r1)
⋂
Φl}. Also, note that Pr {Vc(r1)} = exp {−λlπ(r21 − n21)}. Thus, by choosing
∞ > r1 >
√
1
λlπ
log 2
ǫ′
+ n21, we have Pr {Vc(r1)} < ǫ′/2. Using this, (19) can be written as ǫ1 = ǫ′/2 <
Pr {La,o6→n1
⋂
V(r1)}. Since under the condition of the event V(r1), there exists a node z ∈ B(0, n1)c
⋂
Φl
of finite distance d1 = ‖z‖2 < r1 <∞, which leads to
ǫ1 < Pr {La,o6→n1} < Pr {1s {o→ z, S} = 0} = 1− Pr {1s {o→ z, S} = 1} , (20)
where we have used the fact that for events A and B such that A ⊆ B, Pr{A} ≤ Pr{B}. De-
fine ns = ⌈d1s ⌉. In Fig. 3, let the outer rectangle and the sequence of squares be defined as Js =
[−√3βes, d1 +
√
3βes]× [
√
3βes,−
√
3βes] and Ks =
⋃ns−1
i=0 S
q
i , where S
q
i = [is, (i+ 1)s]× [−s/2, s/2],
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ns − 1. The dimension of Js is ws × (ns + 2
√
3βe)s, where ws = (1 + 2
√
3βe)s. Further,
let Bs = {no EDs in the region Js} and Hs =
⋂ns−1
i=0 { Sqi contains at least one legitimate node}.
Node at (0, 0) Node z at (d1, 0)
s ws
d1
(ns + 2
√
3βe)s
Fig. 3: Nodes at o can securely communicate if the region bounded by the rectangle of dimension ws ×
(ns + 2
√
3βe)s does not have any EDs and each tiles of size s × s at the center contains at least one
legitimate node. Here, ws := (1 + 2
√
3βe)s.
If the event {∃ a secure s-path shown in Fig. 3} occurs then there is a secure s-path. Thus, we choose
ω = s. Therefore, 1s {o→ z, S} = 1 if the event Bs
⋂
Hs occurs, and ǫ1 < Pr {1s {o→ z, S} = 0} =
1− Pr {1s {o→ z, S} = 1} can be written as,
ǫ1 < 1− Pr {Hs ∩Bs} = 1− e−λe|Bs|
(
1− e−λls2
)ns
. (21)
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Recall that ns = ⌈d1s ⌉, and the area of the secure region in Fig. 3 is given by |Bs| = (ns+2
√
3βe)wss, where
ws = (1+ 2
√
3βe)s. This implies that for all s ∈ (0, η/
√
3], there is percolation if
(
1− e−λls2
)ns
> (1−
ǫ1) exp {λe |Bs|}. Equivalently, if the following inequality holds, then the percolation is bound to happen
with non-zero probability: if for some δ ≥ 0, (1−ǫ1) exp {λe |Bs|} < e−δ, and λl > 1s2
[
log
(
1
1−exp{−δns }
)]
.
The first condition implies that λe <
1
|Bs|
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ1
)
− δ
]
, 0 < δ < log
(
1
1−ǫ1
)
. Taking the ratio of this
and the bound on λl, and using s = η/
√
3, we get
λl >
(
ns + 2
√
3βe
)
(1 + 2
√
3βe) log
(
1
1−exp{− δns}
)
Cδ,ǫ1
λe, (22)
where Cδ,ǫ1 =
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ1
)
− δ
]
and ns =
⌈
d1
√
3
η
⌉
. Since we have chosen s = η√
3
, the aforementioned
condition implies that with non-zero probability, a giant component with secure η√
3
-path exists, giving the
desired result. This completes the proof of Theorem 4. 
E. Proof of Corrollary 1
The existence of an η√
3
-path implies the existence of a secure path. Thus, from Theorem 4, we have
Pr{∃ a giant component} ≥ Pr
{
∃ a giant component consisting of η√
3
paths
}
> ǫ1, (23)
from which the result follows. 
F. Proof of Theorem 5
Let us assume that the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied, which implies that with non-zero proba-
bility, there exists a giant component consisting of secure η√
3
-paths. Throughout the proof of Theorem 5,
a path refers to a secure η√
3
-path unless otherwise stated explicitly. Let
Gnsp =
{
∃ a giant component consisting of η√
3
− paths
}
. (24)
Recall that we need to find an upper bound on E|GnspLnsp(0, 1). To accomplish this, consider two nodes
x∗0 = argminx∈Gnsp ‖x − (0, 0)‖2 and x∗1 = argminx∈Gnsp ‖x − (1, 0)‖2. It follows from [34, Lemma 8]
that almost surely, r0 := ‖x∗0‖2 < ∞ and r1 := ‖x∗1 − (1, 0)‖2 < ∞. This implies that almost surely
‖x∗0 − x∗1‖2 < ∞. Now, we need to find an upper bound on the number of hops along the minimum
path in Gnsp between x
∗
0 and x
∗
1. Denote a box of size b × b centered at (0, b/2) by Bb. Conditioned on
the event Gnsp, there exists a δ > 0 and b
∗ > 0 such that Pr|Gnsp{→Bb∗} > δ (see [33]). Recall that the
notation →Bd∗ denotes the left to right (secure) crossing of the square Bb∗ by an η√3-path. Similarly, by
symmetry, we have Pr|Gnsp{← Bb∗} = Pr|Gnsp{↑ Bb∗} = Pr|Gnsp{↓ Bb∗} > δ. For some δnsp > 0, consider
a sequence of squares of size 3jdδnsp × 3jdδnsp centered at ‖x
∗
0−x∗1‖2
2
denoted by Bj , j = 1, 2, . . ., where
dδnsp := max
{‖x∗0 − x∗1‖2, inf{h > 0 : Pr|Gnsp{→ Bh} > δnsp} .
For every b∗ > dδnsp , Pr|Gnsp{a Bb∗} > δnsp, where a ∈ {→,←, ↑, ↓}. Let Ej denote the existence of
a secure open circuit consisting of η√
3
-paths inside the annuli Bj
⋂
Bcj−1, j = 1, 2, . . .. A typical circuit
inside the annuli Bj
⋂
Bcj−1 is illustrated in Fig. 4, where a typical circuit (dashed lines) comprising left
(right) to right (left) and lower (upper) to upper (lower) crossings is also shown.
Suppose if the minimum delay path lies entirely inside Bj , then none of the events E1, E2, . . . , Ej can
occur; otherwise there exists a shorter path leading to a contradiction. Thus,
Pr
|Gnsp
{
η√
3
-path lies outside Bj
}
≤ Pr
|Gnsp
{∩ji=1Eci }. (25)
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3jdδnsp
Fig. 4: A typical square Bj of size 3
jdδnsp × 3jdδnsp .
Consider three consecutive points a, b and c on the minimum delay secure path denoted by Lnsp(0, 1).
Since the paths in the giant component are secure η√
3
-paths, we have η/
√
3 < d(a, c) ≤ 2η. (This is
the place where we use the fact that there exists a secure η/
√
3-path.) Otherwise, the path a to c exists,
resulting in a shorter path compared to Lnsp(0, 1). Thus, we can construct two disjoint circles on a and
c of radius η
2
√
3
. In general, along the path Lnsp(0, 1), we can construct at most Lnsp/2 circles of radius
η
2
√
3
on alternating points, where Lnsp = Lnsp(0, 1). Inside Bj , we can have at most Aj :=
⌈
12×32jd2δnsp
πη2
⌉
non-overlapping circles of radius η
2
√
3
. Therefore, if Lnsp > 2Aj , none of the events E1, E2, . . . , Ej can
occur. Thus, Pr{Lnsp > 2Aj|Gnsp} ≤ Pr{∩ji=1Eci |Gnsp}
(a)
≤ ∏ji=1 Pr{Ecj |Gnsp}, where (a) follows from
the Fortuin-Kasteleyn-Ginibre (FKG) inequality [30] since E1, E2, . . . are increasing events. We say that
an event A is an increasing event if 1A(G) ≤ 1A(H) for every graph G which is a subgraph of H .
Conditioned on the existence of a giant component, we have for all j = 1, 2, . . . , Pr|Gnsp{a Bdδnsp} > δnsp,
where a ∈ C(nsp)rs = {→,←, ↑, ↓}. Due to this, and using the FKG inequality, we have Pr|Gnsp{Ecj |G} ≤
1 −∏
f∈C(nsp)rs Pr|Gnsp{f Bdδnsp} ≤ 1 − δ4nsp. This results in Pr|Gnsp{Lnsp > 2Aj} ≤
(
1− δ4nsp
)j
. Therefore,
E|GnspLnsp can be bounded as follows:
E|GnspLnsp =
∞∑
i=0
Pr{Lnsp > i|Gnsp} = A1 +
∞∑
j=0
Aj+1∑
i=Aj
Pr{Lnsp > i|Gnsp}
(a)
≤ A1 +
∞∑
j=0
∆Aj+1pj
(a)
≤ A1 +
∞∑
j=0
∆Aj+1 (1− δnsp)j , (26)
where (a) follows from the fact that Aj+1 > Aj , pj = Pr{Lnsp > Aj|Gnsp} and ∆Aj+1 = Aj+1−Aj . Also,
∆Aj+1 ≤
96d2δnsp
πη2
32j + 1.
Using this in (26), we get
E|GnspLnsp ≤
12d2δnsp
πη2
+ 1 +
96d2δnsp
πη2
∞∑
j=0
9j(1− δ4nsp)j +
∞∑
j=0
(1− δ4nsp)j, (27)
which can further be simplified to get E|GnspLnsp ≤
12d2δnsp
πη2
(
9δ4nsp
9δ4nsp−8
)
+
1+δ4nsp
δ4nsp
. Conditioned on the existence
of a giant component, we can choose a “big enough” square that results in δnsp >
4
√
8
9
. From this, it
follows that E|GnspLnsp < ∞. Using the fact that Gnsp ⊆ G, we have E|GLnsp < E|GnspLnsp which completes
the proof of Theorem 5. 
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G. Proof of Lemma 2
Let us denote the number of hops corresponding to the minimum delay path by Lnsp = Lnsp(0, 1)
and T (nsp)1 , T
(nsp)
2 , . . . , T
(nsp)
Lnsp
denote the delay for each hop. Thus, the average delay is given by E|GTnsp =
E|G
∑Lnsp
i=1 T
(nsp)
i , where the average is with respect to T
(nsp)
1 , T
(nsp)
2 , . . . , T
(nsp)
Lnsp
and Lnsp. We know that any
hop in the giant component is no larger than η. Thus, using (13), we have
E|G{T (nsp)i } ≤ exp
(
η2
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1−pπγ(βl)
))
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , Lnsp. Note that, for “sufficiently”
large η, with high probability there exists a single link between the source and the destination of unit
distance in which case η can be replaced by a constant. Also, conditioned on the giant component, there
are no EDs around the path. Thus, the bound can be tightened by using λe = 0. We ignore this since
we are interested only in the scaling behavior. Using this, we have the following bound for the average
delay:
E|GTnsp = ELnsp|G
Lnsp∑
i=1
E{Ti},≤ E|GLnsp × exp
(
η2
(
λeπβ
2
e + λl
p
1− pπγ(βl)
))
. (28)
Finally, using the upper bound on E|GLnsp from Theorem 7, we get the desired result. 
H. Proof of Theorem 6
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose there is no
percolation, i.e., Pr{∃ C ⊆ Φl : |C| = ∞ and ∀(x, y) ⊆ Φl, 1s(x⇒y,S) = 1} = 0, where for some
s > 0 (to be chosen later), the event {1s(x⇒y,S) = 1} indicates that there exists a two-secure s-path,
as explained in Section IV-B. Note that, the entire path between nodes need not be secure. Only secure
regions around the source and the destination nodes suffice, as illustrated in Fig. 5, where the union of
secure regions marked in red (along with the corresponding gray region) to the left and right is denoted
by Bs. The packets can be forwarded securely if the region Bs does not contain any EDs. Along the path,
each tile is of size s× s. The outer box is of size ws = (1 + 2
√
3βe)s.
ws
4s
ws
(4 + 2
√
3βe)sFig. 5: Two nodes (circles in blue) communicating via two paths.
By an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we can show that there exists an ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1), and a
node z ∈ B(0, d2)c
⋂
Φl at a distance d2 = ‖z‖2 <∞ such that
ǫ2 < Pr
{
∄ a two-secure s-path between o and any node in B(0, d2)
c
⋂
Φl
}
≤ Pr{Oc1
⋂
Oc2} ≤ min{Pr{Oc1},Pr{Oc2}}, (29)
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where
O1 =
{
∃ a secure s− path between o and the node z in B(0, d2)c
⋂
Φl
}
, (30)
O2 =
{
∃ a split-secure s− path between o and the node z in B(0, d2)c
⋂
Φl
}
. (31)
Here, split s-path refers to a two-secure path which is also a s-path. Now, (29) implies that
ǫ2 < Pr{Oc1} and ǫ2 < Pr{Oc2}, (32)
where, for s = η√
3
, the first inequality coincides with (21) if ǫ1 is replaced by ǫ2, and d1 is replaced by
d2. Thus, using (22), we have
λl >
(⌈
d2
√
3
η
⌉
+ 2
√
3βe
)
(1 + 2
√
3βe) log
(
1
1−exp
{
−δ
⌈
d2
√
3
η
⌉}
)
Cδ,ǫ2
λe, (33)
where Cδ,ǫ2 =
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
− δ
]
. (With a slight abuse of notation, we have used the same notation δ as
in (21).)
From Fig. 5, it is clear that O2 occurs if the regions marked in red denoted
Bs :=
(
o, ((4 + 2
√
3βe)s, ws)
)⋃(
o, (ws, (5 + 2
√
3βe)s)
)
and Bd := {−(x + d1 + 2
√
3βes) : x ∈ Bs}
contain no EDs, and each square of size s× s along the two paths shown contains at least one legitimate
node. Thus, the second expression in (32) can be written as follows:
ǫ2 < 1− Pr
{{
o
(R)
⇒(d2, 0)
}
∩ {Bs and Bd are secure}
}
= 1− e−2λe|Bs|J2(ns+4), (34)
where J =
(
1− e−λls2
)
, ns = ⌈d2s ⌉ for some d2 > n0, and the area of the secure region in the figure
is given by |Bs| = 2s2(1 + 2
√
3βe)(4 +
√
3βe). The notation
{
o
(R)
⇒(d2, 0)
}
denotes that there exists a
rectangluar path in the region R1
⋂
Rc2, where
R1 = {(
√
3βes,
√
3βes)× (
√
3βes+ d2, (
√
3βe + 6)s)}, (35)
R2 = {
(
(
√
3βe + 1)s, (
√
3βe + 1)s
)
×
(
(
√
3βe + 1)s+ d2, 4s
)
, (36)
as shown in Fig. 5. The areas of the two regions Bs and Bd are same. In (34), the exponent 2(ns + 4)
corresponds to the number of square regions of size s × s across the two paths shown in Fig. 5. Thus,
there is percolation if (1 − ǫ2) exp{2λe |Bs|} >
(
1− e−λls2
)2(ns+4)
provided there exists a λl such that
the right hand side above is less than one, i.e., for every δ ≥ 0,
(
1− e−λls2
)2(ns+4)
< exp{−δ} =⇒ λl > 1
s2

log

 1
1− exp
{
− δ
2(ns+4)
}



 , (37)
and the left hand side is less than δ, i.e., for 0 ≤ δ < log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
, λe <
1
2|Bs|
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
− δ
]
. Taking the
ratio of these two inequalities and using s = η/
√
3 results in
λl >
4
(
4 +
√
3βe
)
(1 + 2
√
3βe)
Cδ,ǫ2
log

 1
1− exp
{
− δ
2(ns+4)
}

λe, (38)
where ns =
⌈√
3d2
η
⌉
and Cδ,ǫ2 =
[
log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
− δ
]
for any 0 ≤ δ < log
(
1
1−ǫ2
)
. Combining this with
(33), and the fact that the existence of an η√
3
−path implies the existence of a two-secure path, proves
Theorem 6. 
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I. Proof of Theorem 7
Let us assume that the conditions of Theorem 6 are satisfied, which implies that with non-zero
probability, there exists a giant component consisting of two-secure η√
3
-paths. Recall that a two-secure
path consists of a combination of secure direct paths and secure split-paths. Let
Gsp =
{
∃ a giant component with two-secure η√
3
− paths
}
. (39)
Consider two nodes x∗0 := argminx∈Gsp ‖x − (0, 0)‖2 and x∗1 := argminx∈Gsp ‖x − (1, 0)‖2. It follows
from [34, Lemma 8] that r0 := ‖x∗0 − (0, 0)‖2 < ∞ and r1 := ‖x∗1 − (1, 0)‖2 < ∞ almost surely. This
implies that ‖x∗0 − x∗1‖2 < ∞ almost surely. Now, we need to find an upper bound on the number of
hops along the minimum path in Gsp between x
∗
0 and x
∗
1. Denote a box of size b× b centered at (0, b/2)
by Bb. Conditioned on the event Gsp, there exists a δ > 0 and d
∗ > 0 such that Pr|Gsp{⇒Bd∗} > δ. For
convenience, we use ⇒Bd∗ to denote the left to right crossing of the square Bd∗ , where the paths are
two-secure η√
3
-paths. By symmetry, we have
Pr
|Gsp
{⇔ Bd∗} = Pr|Gsp{⇈ Bd∗} = Pr|Gsp{ Bd∗} > δ. (40)
For some δsp > 0, consider a sequence of squares of size 3
jdδnsp × 3jdδnsp centered at ‖x
∗
0−x∗1‖2
2
denoted
by Bj , j = 1, 2, . . ., where dδsp := max
{
d, inf{d¯ : Pr{⇒ Bd¯} > δsp}
}
. Note that, for every d∗ > dδsp ,
Pr|Gsp{a Bd∗} > δsp, where a ∈ {⇒,⇔,⇈,}. Let Ej denote the existence of a secure open rectangle
circuit inside the annuli Bj
⋂
Bcj−1, j = 1, 2, . . .. Suppose the minimum delay path lies entirely inside Bj .
Then none of the events E1, E2, . . . , Ej can occur; otherwise there exists an even shorter path, leading to
a contradiction. See Fig. 6, where one of the path goes out of the box Bj and the other takes a path along
the circuit, i.e., Node 1 to L1 to (A,B) to (C,D) to (E, F ) to R1 to Node 2. The path along the circuit
is shorter compared to the one that goes out of the box. The crossover to the left and right correspond to
a secure split-path intersecting with a secure direct-path and split-paths crossing each other, respectively.
Node 1 Node 2
L1
L2
R1
R2
A B C D
E F
Box Bj
Fig. 6: A typical path between two nodes denoted Node 1 and Node 2 inside the box Bj .
From Fig. 6 it is easy to see that the shortest path cannot go out of the circuit. Thus,
Pr
|Gsp
{
two-secure
η√
3
-path lies outside of Bj
}
≤ Pr
|Gsp
{∩ji=1Eci }. (41)
Consider three consecutive points a, b and c on Lsp(0, 1). Next, for both split and direct paths, we know
from Theorem 6 that 2η > d(a, c) > η/
√
3. Thus, we can construct two disjoint circles on a and c
of radius η
2
√
3
or more. In general, along the path Lsp := Lsp(0, 1), we can construct at most Lsp/2
disjoint circles of radius η
2
√
3
on alternating points. Inside Bj , we can have at most Aj :=
⌈
12×32jd2
δsp
πη2
⌉
non-overlapping circles of radius η
2
√
3
. Therefore, if Lsp > 2Aj , none of the events E1, E2, . . . , Ej can
occur. Thus, Pr|Gsp{Lsp > 2Aj} ≤ Pr|Gsp{∩ji=1Eci }
(a)
≤ ∏ji=1 Pr|Gsp{Ecj} where (a) follows from the FKG
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inequality, since E1, E2, . . . are increasing events. Conditioned on the existence of a giant component,
we have for all j = 1, 2, . . . , Pr{a Bd∗} > δnsp, where a ∈ Csprs := {⇒,⇔,⇈,}. Due to this, and
using the FKG inequality, we have Pr|Gsp{Ecj} ≤ 1 −
∏
f∈Csprs Pr|Gsp{f Bd∗} ≤ 1 − δ4nsp. This results in
Pr|Gsp{Lsp > 2Aj} ≤
(
1− δ4sp
)j
which leads to
E|GspLsp :=
∞∑
i=0
Pr
|Gsp
{Lsp > i} ≤ A1 +
∞∑
j=0
(Aj+1 − Aj) (1− δsp)j , (42)
which is obtained in a manner similar to (26) in the proof of Theorem 5. Using Aj+1−Aj ≤
96d2δsp
πη2
32j+1,
we can write
E|GspLsp ≤
12d2δsp
πη2
+ 1 +
96d2δsp
πη2
∞∑
j=0
9j(1− δ4sp)j +
∞∑
j=0
(1− δ4sp)j =
12d2δsp
πη2
(
9δ4sp
9δ4sp − 8
)
+
1 + δ4sp
δ4sp
. (43)
Conditioned on Gsp, we can choose a “sufficiently large” square such that δsp >
4
√
8
9
. Using this, it is easy
to see that E|GspLsp <∞. The fact that Gsp ⊆ G completes the proof of Theorem 7. 
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